The opposition has emerged triumphant from Sunday’s Polish parliamentary elections, marking a significant shift from the previous reign of the Law and Justice Party (PiS), which remains the largest party. The Election Commission has confirmed what earlier exit polls projected, namely, Civic Platform (PO) should have enough seats together with centrist Third Way (TD) and the New Left (NL) to form a majority.
This victory wasn’t an accidental turn of events but a culmination of meticulous planning and strategy—ranging from effective communication, opening up the democratising playground for smaller parties and niche voters, to pushing a centrist message that wasn’t revolutionary in worldview. Let’s dissect five successful strategies the opposition implemented, giving political professionals a glimpse into effective campaign tactics.
Want a deeper dive into the Polish election’s backdrop? Check our previous analyses here:
- Lex Tusk: Quo Vadis, Poland?
- Polish opposition united in protest: Is it a good campaign tactic?
- Likes, votes and dangers – A look at social media and politics in Central Europe
- Batman returns – The comeback of European politicians to national politics
- What’s driving Poland’s referendum-election convergence?
- Poland’s election landscape: Polling in a digital age
- INTERVIEW: Insights on Poland’s election from Donald Tusk’s most trusted advisor
The run-up to the Polish elections
In the run-up to Poland’s 2023 elections, the political climate was extremely polarised and tense. The ruling PiS and its allies, Sovereign Poland and the Republicans, launched a fierce campaign, notably targeting opposition leader Donald Tusk, who was equally outspoken. Though PiS once held a robust 43.6 percent in 2019, the week before these elections, its poll share declined to around 36 percent, while the opposition Civic Platform (PO) stood at around 30 percent.
With this diminished lead, the outcome hinged on smaller parties—TD (a coalition of two centrist parties), NL (left wing), and Confederation (libertarian hard right)—which needed to cross the thresholds to enter parliament. Individual parties require five percent and coalitions eight percent to win any seats. Without those forces in parliament, PiS would benefit, but strong performances from smaller parties would tilt the scales away from the ruling party. In polls leading up to the election, support for TD diminished—from 14 percent in May to roughly nine percent days before the election. Still, the opposition had been polling quite high in the final week, with NL (9-11 percent) and TD (10-12 percent) seen passing the thresholds comfortably, and Confederation polling at over 10 percent.
The preliminary exit poll results are in
The results now confirm the incumbent PiS garnered 35.38 percent, the highest among all parties, but it is insufficient to secure a governing majority for a third term. PO came in second with 30.7 percent, and potential allies TD and NL achieved 14.4 percent and 8.6 percent respectively. The far-right Confederation secured 7.1 percent, much less than anticipated. Projections suggest PiS will get 194 seats in the 460-seat Sejm, falling short of a majority, even with Confederation’s projected 18 seats. PO, TD, and NL collectively hold 248 seats, enabling them to form a government.
Remarkably, voter turnout soared to 74.38 percent, the highest since Poland’s 1989 transition from communism, surpassing the previous record of 62.7 percent. While full turnout data will only be available later in the week, it’s clear that the PiS government’s decision to hold a referendum on four tendentious policy questions the same day was one factor in mobilising voters. Yet despite the unprecedented turnout, the referendum failed to meet the 50 percent threshold to be valid by nearly 10 percent, showing voters’ strong aversion to the tactic.
One of the most surprising—and largest—winners was TD, which exceeded all polling numbers. Its double digit score is a reward for staying in the moderate centre while allowing PiS and PO to battle against one another. The NL and Confederation did the same at the polar ends of the political spectrum, but had lower results than were polled. TD drew voters who were not strongly Eurosceptic or revolutionary in their outlook, and weren’t directly associated with PO and PiS.
How did the opposition perform so strongly despite PiS gaining more mandates than any other party?
Five successful strategies of the opposition
Rejecting PiS’ binary choice
Despite PiS’s efforts to dominate the political narrative by presenting voters with a binary choice between themselves and PO, a counter-narrative emerged rejecting this oversimplification. In its attempts to polarise the electorate, PiS unintentionally gave smaller parties a rallying cry. By casting Tusk’s PO as “the true adversary of our nation,” they inadvertently amplified the relevance of the underrepresented. Instead of suppressing the vote for these emerging parties, the opposition galvanised them.
PO originally wanted the entire opposition to run under one banner, but shifted their tactics halfway through the campaign. Voters, dissatisfied with the illusion of only two viable options, were driven to support these smaller factions, particularly TD, strengthening their position. This highlighted the resilience of democratic diversity and the electorate’s determination to ensure a pluralistic political environment through coalition building, as evidenced by tactical voting by some PO supporters for TD.
Leveraging generational divides
Recognising the profound generational divide within the Polish electorate, PO shifted its campaign focus in the final weeks to targeting the youth vote. While established parties, including PiS, historically found their strongholds with older demographics, PO saw an opportunity with the younger, more liberal voters. This strategy paid off. According to data from the IPSOS exit poll—PO led the youth vote with 28.3 percent, followed by NL and others at roughly 15 percent.
What’s more, the mobilisation rallying cry towards the younger generation worked. For the first time, turnout was higher among the 18-29 age group than among the over-60s. By directly addressing the concerns and aspirations of the young, the opposition stood out in a crowded political landscape. This underscores the vital role of age demographics in modern elections. Interestingly, PiS successfully used the same tactic in the past, albeit targeting older voters.
Mobilising civil society
The opposition’s “get-out-the-vote” campaign proved pivotal, achieving the highest turnout since 1989 at just over 74 percent. Pro-democratic civil society organisations were instrumental in this surge. A significant demonstration of their effort was evident when, just two weeks prior to the election, hundreds of thousands gathered in Warsaw for a major opposition rally called the “Million Hearts March”. This event was strategically designed to invigorate voters, and it evidently bore fruit.
Expanding beyond metropolitan strongholds
In a pivotal move, PO transcended their typical metropolitan bases, making significant inroads into small towns and rural areas. Their intensive ‘get out the vote’ campaign played a crucial role in mobilising these previously untapped electorates. Tusk targeted small and medium-sized towns with his campaign bus tour.
The fruits of this strategic outreach were evident, contributing to the historic turnout. By widening their geographical reach and directly engaging with voters outside metropolitan zones, PO not only broadened their support base but also played a significant role in driving up national participation rates.
Capitalising on crisis
The opposition astutely seized on public anger over a series of recent crises and scandals ranging from the contentious abortion ban to the mass resignation of top military generals, a scandal over the selling of migrant visas, a questionable grain deal with Ukraine and the withholding of EU recovery funds over PiS’s attempts to control the judiciary. Tapping into the Exit Poll OGB survey results, which highlighted the economic situation and abortion as pivotal voting reasons, the opposition underscored these issues in their campaigns. By amplifying these crises and linking them clearly to voters’ primary concerns, the opposition strategically positioned themselves as both responsive and in-tune with the electorate’s immediate needs and sentiments.
To the victor goes the spoils?
The opposition’s victory always hinged on whether they would be able to form a government through a coalition between the three major parties—PO, TD, and NL. Together, they have enough mandates now to create a government. The question now is whether President Andrzej Duda will give PiS, the largest party and his own political home, the first chance to form a government, as is traditional.
PiS’ apparent inability to secure a majority, even with Confederation’s mandates, complicates the matter. If Duda aligns with PiS, it could delay the opposition’s chance to govern potentially until late November or even December. If Duda and PiS string out the process, the formation of a new governent could be deferred to 2024.