In the world of politics, the age-old saying, “A good compromise is when both parties are dissatisfied,” often rings true, especially when it comes to electoral coalition setups. As political parties forge alliances to gain power, they navigate the balance of keeping their promises and satisfying their partners, all while facing the ultimate power brokers: the voters.
The research and data make it clear – it is the junior coalition partners that will take the blame and bear the responsibility for not delivering the results. Even though the parties hope that they can outperform their public support in negotiations it is rare. As we’ve seen in the research delivered by Heike Klüver and Jae-Jae Spoon, smaller (and usually more radical) parties are set to lose “an average of 17 percent of the vote in the next election”. Entering the coalition makes them lose their edge and look weak as they feel they have to ask for even the basic elements of their programmes to be introduced.
European coalition experiences: a case study
Across Europe, the dilemma of coalition politics is evident. The broad coalition forming the pro-democratic Polish government has many discontents – the Polish mainstream left-wing party Lewica needed to give up fast introduction of progressive social issues. The decision to hold the progressive social reforms were announced in tranches. The initial coalition agreement sparked controversy with no clear declaration on abortion or same-sex partnerships. It also didn’t seem like there is enough budget to deliver their public investment proposals in terms of housing.
This is when Podemos-style Razem decided to not join the government altogether. The tensions continue in the day-to-day work of the government. The Greens deputy minister for environment, Urszula Zielińska, had to step back from her EU-announced position of Poland pushing for 90 percent emission reduction target after it was met with hostility from within and outside of the Polish government. On other issues that were the campaign driving force for Lewica, such as approach to immigration and push-backs on the border with Belarus or more progressive taxation, the party remains silent.
The biggest winner of the coalition – in terms of influential seats and growing public support – may be the Third Way party which is keeping to its centrist vibe and steers away from any form of strong political statements. All potential controversies are being toned down and they propose they should be settled in a referendum or citizen panel. “Can this alliance of disparate forces navigate the treacherous waters of Polish politics, or will it succumb to its internal contradictions? – asked Miles R. Maftean in the early days of the coalition. The answer is here now – yes, they managed to work it out, and are approaching the local election together too. All based on the mellow political emotion and strong management skills.
“The level of pluralism within the coalition is a novelty in Polish politics, yet so far it appears to be functioning effectively. Notably, the government refrained from appointing a single press spokesman. Coalition members engage directly with their electorates, usually holding separate press conferences. Looking ahead, this lack of unified communication may pose challenges in responding to crises. For now, Polish public opinion appears fatigued after 8 years of centralised, coordinated propaganda machinery championed by previous populists, favouring a more conciliatory approach.” – says Konrad Kiljan, political communication expert from Warsaw.
Implications for the 2024 European Parliament campaign
The forthcoming EP elections underscore the challenges of consensus politics in a climate of low voter turnout and heightened political polarisation. With the continent grappling with the aftermath of the pandemic, farmers’ protests, and the spectre of a strengthened far-right, European parties are mindful of the need for a strategic coalition to counter populist, anti-EU sentiments.
This seems to be the case already – EPP is calling to join forces with the Socialists, the Greens and the Liberals in the next term of office. This might be challenging as the policy divide is very broad: while the Greens and S&D will campaign for a resource extensive Green Social Deal, EPP will underline the need for regulatory pause across the industries. It will be difficult for the fringe parties to convince their voters that there is any chance of implementing their policies and the political process will not be sabotaged by the parties that look to limit the regulatory burden. Also, entering a coalition with EPP might be a minefield given their voting record and tone of discussion in many votes, such as the nature restoration law debate. Same differences will be popping-up in terms of digital & tech regulation, approach to sustainability, public investment and migration and foreign policy.
The coalition compromise: a unified European vision
What might be missing in the media and political coverage on the strong, polarised manifestos is the common ground between all of the mainstream EU parties. They all believe in a common European Union and claim to support both the single market and unified approach to social values – with issues such as “online violence, harassment, and hate speech”.
The already mentioned ultimate power brokers – voters – might be more willing to compromise on the speed and radicality of the changes to ensure that the united Europe will still continue under the same flag. Each of the parties will have the possibility of leading some parts of the process – by being appointed as rapporteurs, shadows and different countries being represented in the Commission.
And this might be the main answer to the question about strong manifestos in the European parties. By design, the EU system aims at de-escalation and consensus between multiple actors. And this is the very thing that the mainstream parties consider a feature of the EU system, while populist and right-wing voters consider a bug that is in urgent need to be solved.
