Picture this: an alliance between two centre parties forms six months before a heated parliamentary election. The main political strategy is to target voters unhappy with the two polarised options—the conservative nationalist government and the liberal centre-right opposition. They poll below the radical right wing party. Would you think, six months later, that they would be the Kingmaker integral to toppling the two-term ruling party?
Well, it happened. The Third Way, an alliance of the centre-right Polish People’s Party (PSL) and centrist Poland 2050 (PL2050), landed the third highest number of votes (14.4 percent). They joined a coalition agreement with Civic Platform (PO) and the Left and were rewarded with seven ministerial posts, including the highly coveted parliamentary speaker and first deputy prime minister positions and the ultra-sensitive defence ministry.
While they don’t sit on the throne, their leaders hold some of the most influential positions reshaping Poland’s political dynamics with a post-political, centrist twist. But who they are, what they stand for, and how they built their influence have been missing from the international spotlight. Let’s zoom in.
The Third Way’s ascent: a marriage of convenience
At its core, the Third Way is a study in contrasts—the deep-rooted, rural conservatism of PSL clashing and intertwining with the neoliberal, conservative urbanism of PL2050. It’s not just an alliance, but a tightrope walk across divergent ideologies. On one side, you have PSL’s seasoned play in coalition politics; on the other, PL2050, under the fresh leadership of former TV host Szymon Hołownia, brings a new beat to the old tune. It’s a blend of past and present, rural and urban, which could be a source of strength—or the very thing that unravels the thread.
Their conservative values align but their policy proposals are a maze of contradictions. United they stand on strong EU ties, judicial reforms, abortion, and decentralisation. But scratch the surface, and cracks appear on societal issues like same-sex marriage. Despite mutual cold feet against same-sex marriage, PL2050 gives a cautious nod to civil partnerships.
Their policy choices mirror this high-wire act. PL2050 is pushing for quick entry into the eurozone, a move that PSL wouldn’t traditionally cheer. The rural stronghold of PSL has different interests from PL2050’s urban bastions. Yet, the real test lies in the chasms of their policy differences in regards to particular issues.
The Third Way’s fractured coalition: a spectre of instability?
With such policy divides, it’s even more interesting to see which positions Prime Minister Donald Tusk gave to PSL and PL2050—and to question whether a cabinet with such inherent divisions can possibly govern effectively. While PO holds most ministerial posts (14), the Third Way has the second most (PL2050 – 3; PSL – 4). Yet it’s what positions these ministers hold that show how fractured and ineffective this new government could be.
Agriculture Minister Czesław Siekierski (PSL) must mend fences with the farming community, long-time backers of PiS, who’ve recently hit rough patches with the government, especially over the issue of Ukrainian grain imports. He must juggle Polish farming interests with a new coalition that leans heavily towards the EU.
Kosiniak-Kamysz (PSL) steps into the Defence Ministry at a decisive time for Poland. Before and after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, PiS ramped up military spending to a staggering 4 percent of GDP, topping NATO charts. This move hasn’t been without its critics. Kosiniak-Kamysz will be caught in the crossfire. On one hand, there’s the need to maintain robust defences and pressure honour orders placed by the previous administration; on the other, voices within the new government are pushing for budget cuts. Any move to trim military spending could be a political ace for PiS.
Paulina Hennig-Kloska (PL2050) takes on the Climate and Environment portfolio, signalling a shift to greener policies, a U-turn from PiS’ coal-heavy energy mix. Yet, early stumbles over wind farm legislation hint at internal discord. Concerns over land requisition led to a hasty retreat and a promise to rework the legislation.
Agnieszka Buczyńska (PL2050), as Minister for Civil Society, represents a newer, civil-focused voice, but her role also underscores the varied and potentially clashing ideologies within the coalition.
This mix of old and new, rural and urban, experienced and novice, is a sign not just of diversity, but of a coalition whose unified front may be more facade than reality. At its core, the Third Way is a conservative-centrist party both fiscally and socially, pushing PO away from the centre to centre-left.
It’s against government handouts, advocates for limited budgets, and opposes social progressive policies. This makes it more problematic for PO and the Left to fulfil key campaign promises for their voters. And most importantly, calls into question the ability of this governing coalition to rule effectively.
A fragile path ahead
The key roles assigned within the coalition—notably PSL’s Kosiniak-Kamysz as first deputy prime minister and Poland 2050’s Hołownia as the parliamentary speaker—suggest a carefully negotiated power-sharing arrangement. However, such arrangements can be tenuous, especially under the stress of governance and external opposition from parties like PiS.
The Third Way’s crucial position is a testament to skilled political manoeuvring that raises questions about its longevity and effectiveness. Can this alliance of disparate forces navigate the treacherous waters of Polish politics, or will it succumb to its internal contradictions? Its survival is crucial to the success of Tusk’s government. A collapse would be a cautionary tale in the challenges inherent in coalitions with fundamentally different visions.
